Testatrix was committed to the state hospital for the insane after being adjudged a person of unsound mind approximately 139 days after signing the will. Will leaves the residuary estate to the attorney who prepared the will, L.A. Adamson. Dr. Merton Minter testified that testatrix was insane. Testatrix's treating physician at the state hospital testified: "Dr. Johnson also stated that in his opinion Mrs. Bates could not have written the codicil here involved except by ‘continued suggestions." The evidence was strong that the attorney drafted the holographic will and codicil. Court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings.

COA goes through the illness in some detail. "‘It was rather hard to tell the particular type, because she had the clinical manifestations or symptoms of both manic depressive insanity and catatonic type of dementia praecox. At that age it may have been either one. I am inclined personally to believe that it was a dementia praecox, catatonic type, because of her record, and because of the onset of the disease. Then she had the voices, she would hear voices, and she would see visions, that were delusions, and that occurs more frequently with the dementia praecox. * * * ‘Catatonic is one of the forms of dementia praecox in which the patient is stationary. You can sit them down and they wll stay there all day, or if you will hold the hand out and leave it, they will hold it there for a long time. They are in a trance an more stuporous, so to speak, and more fixed in their movements, or lack of movements rather. * * * ‘Dementia praecox is a diseased condition of the mind that usually begins in earlier life. However, you may not have a break until late. That is simply a deterioration or a weakening of the mind, the higher processes of memory, judgment, reasoning deteriorate, and gradually weakening all the time.’" "Matters of law are not proper subjects for expert opinion, for, to again quote Wigmore, ‘It is easy to see *397 that on principle the opinion of no witness whatever is needed to tell the Court whether testamentary capacity existed, because that is a matter of applying a legal definition to the data of the testator's mental condition, and the judge (in theory) needs no assistance on that point, even from a legal witness. The data of the mental condition are to be presented, and the jury, under the judge's instructions, are to apply the definition to them.’ VII Wigmore on Evidence 88, § 1958. See also Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 31 S.W. 621, 36 L.R.A. 64."